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Agent based Mobile Negotiation for Personalized Pricing of 
Last Minute Theatre Tickets 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes an agent based mobile negotiation framework for personalized 
pricing of last minutes theatre tickets whose values are dependent on the time remaining 
to the performance and the locations of potential customers. In particular, case based 
reasoning and fuzzy cognitive map techniques are adopted in the negotiation framework 
to identify the best initial offer zone and adopt multi criteria decision in the scoring 
function to evaluate offers. The proposed framework is tested via a computer simulation 
in which personalized pricing policy shows higher market performance than other 
policies therefore the validity of the proposed negotiation framework.  
 
Key words: mobile negotiation, case based reasoning, fuzzy cognitive map, 
personalized pricing, mobile commerce.  
 
1 Introduction 
The pricing mechanism of theatre tickets has been one of the research issues due to its perishable 
nature. The value a perishable commodity deteriorates as time goes and therefore the negotiation 
of the price requires considering time left to the product or service (Chun 2003). Therefore 
discriminated pricing strategy that revises prices of a perishable product and service periodically 
as its expiration time comes close is widely implemented by theatres nowadays, and it is reported 
that such strategy brings better performance to the theatres (Huntington 1993).  
On the other hand, the values of last minute tickets are perceived differently by potential 
customers according to the distances between their current locations and the theatre in which the 
performance is played as well as the time left and personal preferences on the genre of the 
performance. Discriminated pricing strategy still does not fully consider such individual contexts 
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of the purchasing decision making of customers and is regarded as static. The difficulty of 
implementing personalized pricing that considers individual purchasing contexts comes from the 
managerial and administrative cost to update prices every hour or minute (Chun 2003). Therefore 
most of the pricing mechanisms in the literatures are based on probability distribution on 
potential demand of future market rather than current market demand.  
This paper aims to propose an agent based mobile negotiation mechanism to enable real time 
personalized pricing of last minute theatre tickets whose values are dependent on the locations of 
potential purchasers as well as their preferences. It is vital for the service provider to identify 
potential customers who are able to and willing to purchase the ticket at an affordable price 
through a real time negotiation rather than to leave the seats uncharged. According to (Esteves 
2009), personalized pricing or price discrimination can increase industry profit when the service 
providers can have preference information of consumers.   
While there are many negotiation mechanisms proposed for electronic commerce (see Lomuscio 
(2003) for example), a negotiation technique that can be used for mobile commerce where 
customers’ locations play a key role in negotiations is yet to be found. Supporting mobile 
negotiation for last minute tickets requires considering following aspects. Firstly, determining 
the initial offer price by a seller agent is an issue because starting with an unrealistic price can 
make the negotiation process time consuming. Considering the negotiation is usually done few 
hours before the closure time of a performance, it is crucial to complete the negotiation as soon 
as possible before the seats become useless. Secondly, the decision whether to accept an offer 
from counter party is usually done by a single criteria (for example, accept an offer if the offered 
price is lower than maximum price). However, due to its dynamism, the decision on whether to 
accept a price offer is usually require considering multiple dimensions. Also some variables of 
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dimensions change during the negotiation phases (for example, the location of the customers and 
the number of available seats) and it is necessary to make decision considering the changes on 
the situation. Therefore the integration of a multi-dimensional decision making mechanism in the 
negotiation mechanism is required. 
Multi-agent based negotiation framework proposed in this paper adopts case based reasoning 
(CBR) and fuzzy cognitive map (FCM) to determine agreed prices of a last minute ticket 
between mobile consumers and service provider considering the user preferences and current 
location. The proposed framework is tested by comparing with other pricing mechanisms to 
show its advantages in a simulated environment.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Next section provides background information of the 
selected technologies in the paper. The proposed negotiation framework is detailed in section 3 
which is followed by an experiment section that provides the details of the experiment used to 
verify the personalized pricing concept. Then the contributions of the paper are summarized in 
discussions section in which the novelty of the paper is compared with existing studies. Finally, 
the conclusion section summarized the paper and identifies the future research agenda in this 
area.  
2. Background 
2.1 Multi-agent systems 
This paper adopts multi-agent system (MAS) as a basic computing paradigm to semi-automate 
the negotiation processes between sellers and buyers. MASs solve a domain problem via the 
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cooperation of intelligent and autonomous agents that are distributed over a network (Ferber 
1999). 
Multi-agent systems have offered a new dimension for coordination in an enterprise (Lee et al 
2007). The multi-agent system provides an effective platform for coordination and cooperation 
among disputing multiple entities in real world cases. For example, when a conflict occurs 
between buyers and sellers over limited resource, it is difficult for a single authority or 
committee to reconcile it to the full satisfaction of all the entities concerned. The autonomy of an 
agent is a desirable to represent the self-interested nature of negotiating entities. That is, the 
delegation of a task to an agent is done via asynchronous message exchange rather than method 
invocation. The former allow an agent can decide whether it would like to take the task while the 
latter mandates the execution of the task. In negotiation context, the autonomy of an agent can 
best be used to model the decision making to maximize its self-interest.  
Intelligence of an agent is another desirable feature that allows the agent can make decision 
considering multiple factors to maximize its utility. Finally, sociality of an agent allow it identify 
right agents to interact via asynchronous messages which contains messages expressed via an 
agent communication language (ACL, see Ferber (1999) for more details on ACL).  
As all communications among agents are done via asynchronous message exchanges, it is vital to 
manage the maintenance of conversation states of an agent when it is involved with 
conversations with multiple agents at a time. For this purpose, a conversation thread that 
manages the progress of a conversation with one or more counter-part agents is used by an agent. 
Each conversation thread takes a message from the message queue of the agent by referring its 
unique conversation thread identifier. Each conversation thread also employs a conversation 
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policy (Greaves et al 2000) that defines the sequence of messages to be exchanged among 
participating agents for a conversation. A conversation policy (sometimes called as interaction 
protocol) allows two or more agents can exchange messages in a right order. 
In MAMON, sellers and buyers are modeled as agents that represent their interests. Seller agents 
make decision to maximize the profits of ticket sellers and buyer agents the utilities of buyers. 
The exchange of information about initial offer by sellers and counter-offers by buyers are done 
via asynchronous messages according to predefined conversation policy.  
2.2 Case based reasoning 
Terms related to CBR include exemplar-based reasoning, instance-based reasoning, memory-
based reasoning, case-based reasoning, and analogy-based reasoning. The basic idea of CBR is 
to solve new problems by adopting the solutions used to solve similar problems (Hansen and 
Meservy 1994). It is based on the assumption that if two problems are similar, then the solutions 
are probably also similar with each other. Therefore how to measure the similarity is important in 
CBR systems. In a CBR based problem solving, old problems and their solutions are stored in a 
database of cases—the case base. Often the cases are stored as collections of attribute-value pairs, 
but for complex tasks it is necessary to explicitly represent the hierarchical structure of the cases 
by describing them as structured objects, using inheritance, object decomposition, and possibly 
other relations between the object parts. When a new problem needs to be solved, a CBR system 
searches for old problems that are most similar to the new problem. The solutions to the old 
problem can be adapted to meet the requirements of the new problem to resolve any differences 
between the two. CBR has successfully been applied to different problem domains including 
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bankruptcy prediction (Cho et al 2010; Park and Han 2002), business failure prediction (Li and 
Sun 2011), and fault diagnosis (Yang et al 2004) among others in the last decade.  
Considering the advantages of CBR above, MAMON adopts it to reduce time to identify initial 
offer zone by ticket seller agents in a negotiation with buyer agents. CBR is especially useful for 
m-commerce users who do not have sufficient access to all information to consider all the 
constraints before making a purchase decision. By retrieving appropriate past examples and 
suggesting them as benchmarking points, CBR can help theatres make fast decisions on the 
initial price offer zones. 
2.3 Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
Cognitive map was initially proposed (Axelrod 1976) to represents social knowledge via causal 
relationships among major concepts. In a cognitive map, a concept is represented as a node and 
causal relationship between two nodes an arrow. A cognitive map allows analysts analyse the 
complex relationships among target domain via a simple. However, despite its wide application, 
cognitive map had a limitation in representing uncertainty involved in the causal relationships 
among concepts in a map. Kosko (1986) extended the cognitive map to allow modelers add 
uncertainty on the causal relationships among concepts and named it as fuzzy cognitive map 
(FCM) in late 1980’s.  
An FCM allows modelers analyze the strength of impacts of a concept node to other concept 
nodes. In an FCM, arrows are attached with a signed weight value between 0 and 1. The bigger 
the value is, the stronger impact is assumed between two concepts. Arrow also indicates the 
direction of such impact. Fuzzy causal algebra is applied to calculate the amount of indirect and 
maximum impacts from a concept node to another.   
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Due to the analytic power of FCM, it has been applied to solving unstructured problems in wide 
domains. Examples, although not exhaustive, drought and desertification analysis (Maraglino et 
al 2010), strategic planning problems (Ramaprasad and Poon 1985), group cognitive mapping 
(Tegarden and Sheetz 2003), designing EDI (electronic data interchange) control (Lee and Han 
2000) and risk analysis and management (Lazzerini and Mkrtchyan 2011).  
By integrating FCM, MAMON agents are able to provide decision makers on the move with 
more improved decision support functions. There are many factors that are influencing m-
commerce decisions either indirectly or directly. However, users cannot afford to consider all the 
causal relationships among those factors thoroughly in a situation when they need to move and 
there is not enough time. In that situation, FCM can provide an analytical and systematical way 
of investigating causal relationships between all the factors related to the m-commerce situation.  
3. MAMON: Multi-Agent based MObile Negotiation framework 
MAMON is a location based negotiation framework where buyer agents represent buyers on the 
move and a seller agent a seller under time and location constraints. Three types of agent play a 
major role in MAMON: B-agent, S-agent, and M-agent. B-agents are usually located on buyers’ 
mobile devices to represent the buyers’ interests while S-agents on more powerful desktops or 
servers to represent sellers. Finally, an M-agent is usually located on a desktop or server and acts 
as a mediator between S-agents and B-agents. The two types of agent subscribe to an M-agent 
which store information needed in negotiation processes, such as the location of S-agents and B-
agents and related ticket information. An M-agent only mediates the two agents as a registration 
of agents but is not involved in the negotiation processes of the two types of agents. 
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3.1 S-agent 
Fig. 1 shows a flow chart that represents the internal logic of an S-agent for a negotiation to sell a 
last minute ticket. The ultimate goal of an S-agent is to maximize the profit of a seller it 
represents. For this purpose, an S-agent seeks potential buyers in within a specific time limit. 
Then it calculates the bid price of the selling ticket based on CBR, and sends an offer including 
price and ticket details to the potential B-agents.  
A wide variety of past selling instances are stored in a case base, and the proposed CBR uses the 
similarity index (SI) to select a case that has the highest similarity with current selling situation. 
Once such cases are identified, the price offer can be made referring to the price information 
attached to the selected cases.  
In this paper, a priority adjusted case selection (PACS) mechanism is proposed to have an 
enhanced initial bid mechanism based on CBR. PACS select a case (c) from a case base using 
equation (1). 
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Fig. 1 Negotiation process of S-agent 
 
c = min SIi (cnew) ⓣ  j (min DIFF (ci,j, cnew,j))    …….……………… (1)  
In equation (1), the operator ⓣ first returns a value from the evaluation of left hand side operand 
function (min SIi(cnew)). min SIi(cnew) returns a case whose SI value is smaller or at least equal 
than other cases (i = 1, 2, …, m). The SI value of each case in comparison with new case (cnew) is 
calculated using equation (2).  
SIi = √∑ (      )
  
    ………………………………………..……. (2) 
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In equation (2), Nj indicates j
th
 (j=1,2,…,n) attribute value of a new case, and Sij denotes j
th
 
attribute value of i
th
 (i=1,2,…, m) case in the case base.  
If the function returns more than one value, then the operator evaluates the operand function on 
the right hand side ( j (min DIFF (ci,j, cnew,j))). The DIFF function is defined in equation (3). 
DIFF (Nj, Sij) = | Nj – Sij |   …………………………………………. (3) 
That is, DIFF function returns the absolute value of the difference between two argument values 
(Nj, Sij). The  pj functions go through for each attribute (j = 1, 2, …, n) from highest priority 
attribute to lower one until a tie is broken among the comparison cases when DIFF function is 
applied to the attribute values.  
As shown above, PACS uses Euclidean distances between a new case and existing cases in a 
Case Base to identify the most similar case. The initial price of the new case for the negotiation 
process is simply the price of the identified the most similar case in the case base. If there are ties 
on the Euclidean distances between two or more cases in the Case Base, then the tied cases are 
compared on the attribute with highest priority. The comparison is repeated on the lower priority 
attributes until the tie is broken. A randomly selected case is chosen if the tie is not resolved after 
the comparisons on the all attributes.  
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 Casenew Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 … Case m Priority 
Attribute 1 N1 S11 S21 S31 … Sm1 P3 
Attribute 2 N2 S12 S22 S32 … Sm2 P2 
Attribute 3 N3 S13 S23 S33 … Sm3 P1 
… … … … … … … … 
Attribute n Nn S1n S2n S3n … Smn Pn 
SIi  SI1 SI2 SI3 … SIm 1
st
 compare 
SIi,3  | N3 - S13 | | N3 – S23 | | N3 – S33 | … | N3 – Sm3 | 2
nd
 compare 
SI i,2  | N2 - S12 | | N2 – S22 | | N2 – S32 | … | N2 – Sm2 | 3
rd
  compare 
SI i,1  | N1 - S11 | | N1 – S21 | | N1 – S31 | … | N1 – Sm1 | 4
th
  compare 
…  … … … … … … 
SI i,n  | Nn - S1n | | Nn- S2n | | Nn - S3n | … | Nn – Smn | n+1
th
 compare 
Table 1 Priority adjusted Case selection method 
 
Table 1 illustrates the process described above. The attributes of the case base are composed of 
the factors which the seller considers as important for the initial asking price and can be various 
according to the characteristics of the target ticket.  
If a buyer accepts the price offered by the S-agent, then the negotiation process is completed. 
However, if no buyer accepts the price offered by the S-agent, and counter-offers with updated 
price are sent to the S-agent by B-agents, then the S-agent evaluates the counter-offers using 
FCM inference.  
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FCM allows decision makers merge quantitative attributes with qualitative ones for their 
decision making. Usually, the identification of such attributes is performed by multiple experts 
who have experiences in the sales processes of last minute tickets. In this paper, the details of 
composing an FCM through the identification of attributes are skipped to make the paper concise. 
Nelson et al (2000) provide a detailed explanation on the process. Fig. 2 shows an example FCM 
for the negotiation in MAMON.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 A sample FCM for Decision index 
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The FCM shows interactions among twelve factors. Solid circles represent quantitative variables 
while dotted circles qualitative ones. A decision variable, Decision Index, is determined by two 
qualitative variables: favorable condition and unfavorable condition. Favorable condition is 
determined by two other variables while unfavorable condition by four other variables. If a B-
agent counter-offers an updated price, then the S-agent performs a forward-evolved inference to 
calculate the value of DI (Decision Index). The S-agent makes a deal with the B-agent if and 
only if the offered DI is bigger than the threshold value of DI otherwise move to next round of 
negotiation to agree on the price.  
A forward-evolved inference process of an FCM is usually considered as a what-if analysis to 
gauge the impacts of a state event to one or more decision variables (Decision Index, DI in Fig. 
2). The state event is usually represented as a concept vector that contains values of each concept 
in the FCM and represents current sale situation in real world.  
The initial state vector is multiplied by the adjacency matrix of the FCM and new states of the 
system are derived through a transfer function. That is, 
C
t+1
 =  (Ct  E) ………………………………………………….…… (4) 
In equation (4), C
t+1
 is a system state vector at time t+1, C
t
 a system state vector at time t, E 
adjacent matrix of the FCM, and  a transfer function. The transfer function  is required to 
make the resulting concept values of the new state vector lies between -1 and 1. The most widely 
used discrete transfer functions include sign function, threshold function, and trivalent function 
(Tsadiras 2008). The first two functions convert a resulting concept value into either 0 or 1, the 
third into [-1, 0, 1] while the sigmoid function any value between -1 and 1. 
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The state derivation through above formula is repeated until either the state of the system arrives 
at equilibrium where the same state is derived at certain point or falls into a limit cycle behavior, 
that is, a certain sequence of states are repeated. 
The adjacency matrix E corresponding to Fig. 2 is as follows. 
 
C1 = (1 1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0). 
Let’s assume that a seller’s initial price bid has been rejected by buyers, and the seller has 
counter-offers from buyers for a ticket. It is also assumed that the price difference between 
buyers and the seller are small; the box office rank of the ticket is relatively high; the number of 
theatres that play the performance is relatively high; it is a weekday; remaining time to the 
performance is very short; and the theatre is implementing an aggressive promotion strategy. 
This negotiation context can be converted into the value between –1 and 1 and can be described 
by a vector as follows : 
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C1 = (1 1 -1 -1 0 -1 0 0 0 0 -1 0). 
Multiplying this by E, we get the second concept node vector C2.  
      C1 x E = (0 0 0 0 0 0.9 -0.8 0 0 -0.8 0 0)   Tri   (0 0 0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 -1 0 0) = C2  … (5) 
The Tri  in equation (5) is a trivalent function which converts a left-hand side Cartesian value 
into either -1 (if < 0), 0 (if 0) or 1 (if > 0). This process is repeated using the newly derived state 
vector until the system reaches to an equilibrium or limited cyclic behavior. If the inference 
process reaches to a equilibrium state, then the concept value of the decision variable (Decision 
Index) will determine whether a counter-offer price from a buyer can be accepted (DI =0) or 
rejected (DI=1). 
3.2 B-agent 
The role of B-agent is relatively simple compared to that of an S-agent due to two reasons. 
Firstly, B-agents usually are located on handheld devices which have limited computing power 
therefore not appropriate to adopt a sophisticated computing algorithm which may degrade the 
performance of the system in terms of computing time. Secondly, the final decision is usually 
made by human users rather than B-agents which are mostly responsible on recommending 
options available for the human users.  
A B-agent incorporates following utility function: 
U = Wk * Fk,   Wk = 1 ………………………………………….…. (5) 
That is, a buyer’s utility U is a summation of products between the buyer’s preference weight on 
factor k (Wk) and the buyer’s preference value on factor k (Fk). The sum of preference weights 
on all factors is 1.  
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The utility factors can include not only price, product, and quality but also contextual 
information such as the buyer’s current location and environmental constraints. In this paper the 
weight values on utility factors were obtained via asking the buyer through a 7-scale 
questionnaire on mobile devices when B-agents are installed on their devices.  
That is,  
Wk = Sk /Σ Sk   ………………………………..……………………….. (6)  
In equation (6), Sk is a 7-scale score on the factor k, and k = 1, 2, …,  h. At the same time, the 
target levels of utility factors are also asked through the questionnaire. A target utility (TU) 
represents the maximum level the buyer is willing to pay for cost related variables (or minimum 
level the buyer wish to achieve for incentive related variables). If a B-agent gets a price offer 
from an S-agent and the offer does not meet the buyer’s TU, then the B-agent calculates a 
counter-offer price as below. In MAMON, the price adjustment is made based on target utility, 
perceived utility from a ticket, and prior price offered as below. 
TU = Σ Wk * F

k, where F

k is the goal target on factor i 
PUl = Σ Wk * Fkl, where Fkl is the buyer’s evaluation on ticket l for factor k 
pricel
t+1
= pricel
t
 - (TU – PUl) / Sf …………………………..……….. (7) 
In equation (7), the adjusted price of ticket l is derived based on the previous offered price 
(pricel
t
), the target utility of a buyer (TU), and the perceived utility on the proposed ticket l (PUl). 
The speed factor Sf is used to reflect the degree of willingness of the buyer to have a successful 
negotiation.   
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If the S-agent accepts the counter-offer, then the deal is completed. However, if rejected, then the 
B-agent can adjust the offer by decreasing its goal utility for next round of negotiation until the 
process is completed with an agreed deal or failure.  
4. Experiments 
The validity of the MAMON was tested through a computer simulation. The goal of the 
experiment was to test if the MAMON based mobile service market shows better performance 
(higher overall utility for buyers and profits for sellers) than traditional markets (without 
negotiations between sellers and buyers) do.  
4.1 Simulation model 
Theatres have 200 seats, cost $700 per performance regardless of genres, and start selling tickets 
for vacant seats an hour before a performance commences. List price for a ticket is $7, and a 
theatre plays four types of genre. The box office rankings of performances range between 1 and 
10. 
In the simulation, all customers are assumed that they do not have any other commitments apart 
from visiting theatres and will purchase a ticket only if the perceived utility of the ticket is equal 
or bigger than their target utilities. Customer’s utility function includes following five factors: 
distance (D) from customer’s current location to theater (for experiment, it is adjusted between -
18 and 18); box office ranking of the movie (R); movie genre (G); newly adjusted ticket price 
that customers want (P); and timeliness showing whether it is the exact time that customer wants 
(T). Based on the factors, ith customer’s utility is calculated as follows. 
i i i i ii D i R i G i P i T i
U W D W R W G W P W T= × + × + × + × + ×  ………………………..….. (8) 
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Table 2 addresses the various conditions and their converted values for the five utility factors.  
Utility factor Condition Converted value 
Distance from the 
theater (D) 
In 20 minutes 
In 30 minutes 
In 40 minutes 
In 50 minutes 
More than 60 minutes 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Box office ranking 
(R) 
1,2 
3,4 
5,6 
7,8 
9,10 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
Movie genre (G) 
Customer wanted 
Customer did not want 
50 
0 
Ticket price (P) 
For any new ticket price  
adjusted by customers 
50 – (new ticket price / list 
price) * 50 
Timeliness (T) 
Exact time that customer wants 
Otherwise  
50 
0 
Table 2 Buyer’s utility factors 
 
We classify theatres into three different groups according to their strategy for ticket pricing. 
Firstly, normal transaction group sticks with fixed pricing strategy so no discount on the ticket 
price will be offered regardless of the time remaining to the performance. Secondly, passive 
transaction group adopts price discrimination strategy which discounts ticket prices periodically 
according to the time left to a performance. The customers in this group are equipped with 
mobile devices but no negotiation between customers and theatres. Theatres in this group offer 
discriminated prices to customers through mobile channels every 20 minutes depending on the 
vacancy rate- $6.5 if vacancy rate < 40%, $6.0 if 40% ≤ vacancy rate ≤ 50%, $5.0 if 50% ≤ 
vacancy rate ≤ 60%, $4.0 if 60% ≤ vacancy rate ≤ 70%, $3.0 if 70% ≤ vacancy rate ≤ 80%, $2.0 
if 80% ≤ vacancy rate. Finally aggressive transaction group actors employ personalized pricing 
strategy via the MAMON negotiation mechanism for the transactions. Theaters in this group are 
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offering different ranges of price using CBR inference where a case is composed of four input 
attributes (current vacancy rate (%), remaining time before the performance of the ticket 
(minutes), box office ranking of the performance, approximate number of reachable customers) 
and one output attribute (ticket price). Therefore, the price changes in accordance with the input 
attribute values which represent the circumstances of the theaters. The FCM as shown in Fig. 2 is 
used to inference the decision on accepting the newly adjusted price offered by the buyers. The 
theatre accepts the counter offer price if FCM result is less than 0 as unfavorable conditions is 
dominating in the market. Otherwise it rejects the counter offer and the buyer’s seat number and 
show time are specified accordingly. Table 3 is used for the transformation of negotiation 
contexts into FCM concept values.  
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Constructs Condition Transformed values 
Difference 
between 
prices(DP) 
Difference ≤ 10% seller’s price 
10% < Difference ≤ 20% 
20% < Difference ≤ 30% 
Difference ≥ 30% seller’s price 
-1 
-0.5 
0.5 
1 
Box office rank 
(CF1) 
Rank 1, 2 
Rank 3,4 
Rank 5,6 
Rank 7 ~ 10 
1 
5 
–0.5 
-1 
Number of same 
movie (CF2) 
4 ~ 
2 ~ 3 
1 
0 
1 
0.5 
-0.5 
-1 
Forecasted 
Demand (FD) 
Many* 
Normal** 
Few*** 
1 
0 
-1 
Remaining Time 
(RT) 
Time ≤ 20 minutes 
20 minutes < Time ≤ 60 minutes 
60 minutes < Time ≤ 120 minutes 
Time ≥ 120 minutes 
1 
0.5 
-0.5 
-1 
Current vacancy 
rate (SI) 
40% ~ 
30% ~ 40% 
20% ~ 30% 
10% ~ 20% 
~ 10% 
1 
0.7 
0.5 
-0.5 
-1 
Promotion (PM) 
No promotion 
Passive promotion 
Aggressive promotion 
Very aggressive promotion 
-1 
-0.5 
0.5 
1 
Weekday (WD) 
Weekend or holiday 
Friday 
Monday ~ Thursday 
1 
0.7 
-1 
Decision Index 
(DI) 
Reject offer 
Accept offer 
< 0.5 
≥ 0.5 
*Many: # of reachable customers is greater than the total # of vacant seats of theaters 
**Normal : # of reachable customers  is equal to the total # of vacant seats of theaters  
***Few: # of reachable customers is less than the total # of vacant seats of theaters 
Table 3 Input constructs and conditions for theater’s FCM 
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4.2 Results 
The MANON simulation prototype was developed using NetLogo. NetLogo is a programmable 
modeling environment for simulating natural and social phenomena. It is particularly well suited 
for modeling complex systems developing over time.   
The initial conditions of the simulation are as follows. Total rounds of simulation is 30, number 
of theaters 12 (4 in normal group, 4 in passive group, and 4 in aggressive group, number of 
customers 600 (evenly assigned to three groups), theaters in passive group sending discriminated 
prices every 20 minutes to nearby users, and theaters starting to offer discounted price 60 
minutes before the show. The simulation results with MAMON are shown in Fig. 3 and the 
detailed results are provided in Appendix.  
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(b) Theaters’ average profits 
Fig. 3 Utilities and margins by MAMON simulation  
 
Statistical results in Table 4 reveal that customers transacting with theatres in aggressive group 
achieved highest customer utilities and the theatres highest profits. The one way ANOVA and 
Pro Hoc tests results in Table 4 shows that the differences among the three groups are 
statistically significant (p<0.01) and there is no homogeneous subsets indicating the values of 
utilities and profits can be clearly categorized into three different groups respectively. 
 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
377577.817 2 188788.908 63.857 .000 
Within 
Groups 
257208.903 87 2956.424     
Total 634786.720 89       
(a) One way ANOVA results for the average customer utilities. 
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AUC N 
Subset for alpha = .05 
aggressive passive normal 
normal 30 315.0833     
passive 30   402.5667   
aggressive 30     473.4500 
Sig.   1.000 1.000 1.000 
(b) Post Hoc Tests results for the average customer utilities. 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 
1100084888039.023 2 550042444019.512 131.496 .000 
Within 
Groups 
363917603568.800 87 4182960960.561     
Total 1464002491607.823 89       
(c) One way ANOVA results of Theatres average profits. 
AMC N 
Subset for alpha = .05 
aggressive passive normal 
normal 30 169658.3333     
passive 30   361521.6667   
aggressive 30     431106.1333 
Sig.   1.000 1.000 1.000 
(d) Post Hoc Tests of the Theatres average profits. 
Table 4 Results of statistical test 
5. Discussions  
The contributions of the paper are twofold. Firstly, this paper tested the feasibility of 
personalized pricing in mobile commerce context. Perishable commodities pricing has been 
addressed in the literature since 1980s (Chun 2003; Jia and Hu 2011; Pasternack 1985). Jia and 
Hu (2011) are addressing the pricing and returning policies of perishable commodities like food. 
On the other hand, Chun (2003) is addressing the calculating the optimal fixed price for a given 
period. The major research issue in this area is finding reordering point of the inventory of 
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decaying products and pricing policies. The common pricing policy is considering fixed time 
duration and do not consider the demand side preferences which was the core feature of the 
pricing mechanism of the paper. Pricing of tickets for performance is also addressed in the 
literature and the major focus on pricing of theatre tickets has been on the comparison between 
single price and price discrimination. Leslie (2004) argues that price discrimination improves the 
industry profits while it does not have impact to the consumer surplus. Esteves (2009) goes 
further on this argument by revealing the importance of considering consumer preference 
information on the price discrimination. On the other hand, Orbach and Einav (2007) analyzes 
the uniform pricing policy in film industry and argues that price discrimination would bring more 
profits to film exhibitors via change on legal constraints.  In spite of such theoretical support on 
the benefits of price discrimination for the industry, the real world price discrimination 
mechanism is relatively limited. Leslie (2004) exemplifies the price discrimination in Broadway 
theatres as follows. Second-degree discrimination or non-linear discrimination set different 
prices for different seat qualities. Third-degree discrimination refers to mail coupon which is sent 
to potential consumers who are less willing to purchase the tickets. Finally, day-of-performance 
half-priced tickets which are sold in street ticket booth are further discrimination strategy. The 
personalized pricing via mobile negotiation addressed in this paper goes a step further by 
enabling the theatre managers set different prices for different potential consumers who have 
different preferences and therefore different value mechanisms. 
Secondly, this paper also enhances the negotiation under time and location constraints through 
novel application of CBR and FCM in the negotiation strategy. Agent based negotiation has been 
widely adopted in electronic commerce domain since 1990s (Lomuscio et al 2003; Sandholm 
and Lesser 1995). The major issues in the discipline include identifying novel negotiation 
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protocol and negotiation strategies. The former is mainly concerned with defining the message 
sequences that are exchanged between negotiating agents while the latter making the negotiating 
agents be able to decide an initial price, how to increase/decrease counter offer price, accept or 
reject an offer. Scoring functions are usually used to make decision on accepting or rejecting an 
offer from counter parties (Faratin et al 1998). While the initial offer or offer zone in a 
negotiation is reported to have significant effect on the negotiation outcome (Poucke and 
Buelens 2002), the literature lacks studies on mechanism to decide the initial offer. One of the 
most widely used scoring functions to evaluate an offer is based on weighted multi criteria 
function which produce a score (accept or reject) by summing weighted scores of multiple 
attributes (Faratin et al 1998; Huang et al 2010).    
In this paper, the decision to accept/reject a counter-offer from a buyer agent by a seller agent is 
made via Fuzzy Cognitive Map which allows decision maker considers the causal relationships 
among multiple factors in the scoring function to accept or reject a counter-offer from a buyer 
agent. CBR inference incorporated within S-agents is the first approach in negotiation literature 
to identify initial offer zone under time constraints. Different price offer for different customers 
considering the current negotiation contexts is considered crucial in such time constraining 
circumstance. FCM finds its great potential in a negotiation process due to its generalized 
inference capability in a presence of a number of interrelated factors. Without FCM, decision 
makers would feel very stressful to consider all the complicated causal relationships among the 
relevant factors and expect future inference results.  
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6. Conclusion  
This paper proposed a mobile negotiation framework for personalized pricing of theatre tickets 
under time and location constraints.  Its economic value and technical feasibility were tested by a 
simulation experiment. The personalized pricing strategy turned out to be more market effective 
than price discrimination and fixed pricing strategies. The feasibility of using CBR and FCM as a 
negotiation tools was also proved via the implementation of MAMON negotiation as a part of 
the simulation experiment.  
This study poses some implications for future m-commerce research. M-commerce is blooming 
as mobile devices are providing increased convenience and performance in users’ daily activities. 
However, there have been fewer efforts on developing mobile negotiation support systems in the 
literature and this study sheds a light on using the generalized multi-agents framework equipped 
with CBR and FCB for designing more enhanced mobile negotiation support systems. 
Furthermore, we proposed practical algorithms based on CBR and FCM to enhance the 
performance of the negotiations.  
The future research directions are as follows. Firstly, the experiment was based on computer 
simulation and empirical testing of the proposed framework in real world context is required. 
Secondly, no comparison between the proposed negotiation algorithms (CBR for initial offer 
zone and FCM for effectiveness) with other negotiation mechanisms was made and will be 
included in the next research agenda. The comparison of the performance of negotiation 
algorithms is considered as a difficult task if not impossible. Firstly evaluation metrics need to be 
developed for the comparisons of negotiation performance. Additionally, the metrics need to 
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include not only quantitative factors, but also qualitative factors. This will be incorporated in the 
future researches. 
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Appendix   The simulation results 
Simulation 
round 
Average utility of customer Average margin of cinema 
normal aggressive passive normal aggressive passive 
1 377.4 513.2 431.9 160,500 490,561 372,050 
2 301.7 512.0 458.5 185,000 374,350 402,000 
3 306.3 502.9 433.7 106,250 404,561 499,975 
4 406.5 432.7 404.1 237,500 440,554 293,250 
5 379.7 516.9 436.6 116,750 456,481 391,300 
6 349.9 390.3 358.6 153,500 382,933 379,250 
7 380.7 481.4 473.4 272,500 435,343 303,725 
8 214.8 484.8 457.8 95,750 456,356 293,500 
9 224.9 351.1 338.1 279,500 259,523 349,500 
10 340.4 439.7 390.4 102,750 484,697 351,250 
11 211.4 431.1 317.0 209,500 381,274 328,500 
12 339.4 524.3 474.3 192,000 445,238 398,075 
13 315.2 546.3 403.4 139,500 496,005 366,825 
14 306.2 517.1 431.6 265,500 496,915 281,250 
15 270.3 459.7 355.9 157,000 481,426 298,675 
16 444.1 390.3 408.2 192,000 420,356 311,000 
17 310.0 480.7 372.2 153,500 409,113 319,750 
18 295.8 437.8 412.4 216,500 278,263 500,000 
19 403.2 427.8 370.1 123,750 496,030 337,200 
20 351.5 409.0 320.2 52,000 477,642 401,875 
21 257.3 450.4 341.7 199,000 394,516 340,700 
22 267.1 471.3 391.4 249,750 416,406 330,175 
23 269.3 464.5 347.5 136,000 462,857 331,600 
24 295.3 526.0 468.1 45,000 461,533 447,500 
25 246.2 402.8 390.1 276,000 254,445 431,675 
26 303.1 472.2 387.8 118,500 485,697 321,400 
27 256.9 490.7 360.7 148,250 499,977 352,575 
28 357.4 509.1 433.1 132,500 481,277 409,000 
29 343.2 611.5 468.6 246,250 452,114 265,125 
30 327.3 555.9 439.6 127,250 456,741 436,950 
 
 
